Intuitions of weirdness

[jducoeur]

[Happy birthday to shava23!]

I'm beginning to suspect that I'm rather weird. That's not going to surprise folks, but I'd like to take a quick survey. Note that the following questions are entirely about intuition -- not what you intellectually think, but what, at a *gut* level, seems correct to you, so don't spend a lot of time thinking about it. Yes, I'm being intentionally simplistic in the replies: I'm curious whether, when pushed into a black and white answer about their gut reaction, folks find these ideas sensible.

[Poll #1029830]

Comments

[metahacker.livejournal.com]

I wobble wildly on the last one. Rationally it's neutral: if I believe in physical determinism as in Q3, then there's no sense worrying about determinism; it's inescapable. (Of course one can argue in that case my worrying is predetermined, but that's silly.) Worrying only comes from thinking there is some sort of 'purpose' in life. (More to say here later; siderea just touched on this over in quantumkitty's blog...)

Physics as I know it does indicate determinism; Hofstaeder has a very compelling argument in either Mind's Eye or a subsequent book which made me agree that consciousness could be arising simply from physical proceses. But my personal escape clause to this deterministic view of my own behavior -- following as I do physics as I understand it down to the bottom level -- is that quantum physics is *not* deterministic, at least, not yet (i.e. it might be, but we don't understand how yet). The quantum bubbling of the space/time foam opens the door for Self, for a place to hide the homunculus of free will. And the sort of flickering that goes on in the brain is a perfect amplifier of quantum effects to the macroscopic level -- single-atom effects can cascade upwards to major decisions.

PS: I'm not clear how Q1 and Q2 lead to Q4; the infinite other worlds that might be have absolutely no impact on me, and I really can't bring myself to worry about them. If there were some inter-communication, maybe...but I'm okay with there being a very large infinity of universes that don't contain me in any (or any recognizable) form.

[jducoeur]

but I'm okay with there being a very large infinity of universes that don't contain me in any (or any recognizable) form.

I'm interested in gut reactions to the notion of absence of free will, or to the variant that, for every decision we make, we have *also* made every other decision. (Which is often taken as another way of saying "no free will".) So it's not so much about the many universes in which you aren't recognizably present, as the ones where you *are* there, but different in the different decisions. Mostly, though, that question was an afterthought, written after I'd done the first three, so if the sequiteur seems a little weak that's not entirely surprising.

This poll was written in reaction to an article in Newsweek last week, which was making (in passing) the usual points about how strange many-worlds is, and how hard it is to contemplate absence of free will. Which made me reflect yet again on the fact that I'm probably unusual in that I actually *do* answer "Yes" to all of the above. Hence this quick poll of my flist, which I think is pretty literate in both science and science fiction, and likely to understand the questions: I'm wondering how other people internalize this stuff...

[alexx-kay.livejournal.com]

the variant that, for every decision we make, we have *also* made every other decision.

Larry Niven wrote a short story on that theme, whose protagonist despaired because for every "good" choice he had made, he had also made all the "bad" ones. I had a strong negative emotional reaction to that story, because this seemed like a really stupid, and partially nonsensical attitude to take.

Objection 1: "Many Worlds" posits an extremely large number of variations, indeed every "possible" variation -- but this is actually a much smaller set than that of every *conceivable* variation. A person of strong morals (such as the protagonist of the story), presented with a significant "moral choice" doesn't really *choose*; they will always react the same way (or near enough as makes no odds). I can *conceive* of universes in which "I" randomly decide to go on a mass killing spree, but I don't think they're actually *possible*, starting from where I am now. My moral wiring is too strong.

Objection 2: OK, let's caveat those last few notions. I could be traumatized, or suffer brain damage, or some such set of events. It is just barely possible (though, I maintain, extremely unlikely) that some entity descended from the current incarnation of me could, for example, go on a killing spree. But that would be such a radically different creature from the current me, that I see no particular reason to identify with it as *being*, in any meaningful sense, me. I explicitly disown any such extreme variations from what I currently perceive myself to be.

[jducoeur]

Objection 1: "Many Worlds" posits an extremely large number of variations, indeed every "possible" variation -- but this is actually a much smaller set than that of every *conceivable* variation. A person of strong morals (such as the protagonist of the story), presented with a significant "moral choice" doesn't really *choose*; they will always react the same way (or near enough as makes no odds). I can *conceive* of universes in which "I" randomly decide to go on a mass killing spree, but I don't think they're actually *possible*, starting from where I am now. My moral wiring is too strong.

That's a reasonable view -- indeed, pretty close to my own. But it's also a fuzzy view. At any given moment, my probability of making a given decision is extremely high, but as I look at ever-further-back branch points, things can potentially diverge more and more. Go back far enough, and then wind forward along a different path, and you wind up with someone making decisions that "I" would consider inconceivable.

Basically, if you follow this logic through, you wind up with a definition of self that is essentially instantaneous in nature. "I" exist right now, as a result of the events that have led to me. That says little about who I am at the core, though, because my future paths *will* diverge -- perhaps gradually, but in all likelihood ever-further apart. Personally, I'm comfortable with that outcome, but my guess is that many people aren't, because it requires admitting the sheer uncertainty of the future, not just in my surroundings but in who I truly am.

Really accepting many-worlds means I can affect my highest probability states, but I can't *control* the future -- even the future of myself. It's things like that that are slowly turning me into a Buddhist (and a bit of a mystic), at least on the philosophical level...

[siderea]

"Touch"? Heh, I thought it more like "clubbed it with a baseball bat".

But my personal escape clause to this deterministic view of my own behavior -- following as I do physics as I understand it down to the bottom level -- is that quantum physics is *not* deterministic, at least, not yet (i.e. it might be, but we don't understand how yet).

Er, at the risk of precipitating an existential crisis, how does being the determined result of RAND() calls instead of FUNCTION(x, y) calls give you more free will? Why is being the helpless puppet of dice role superior to being the helpless puppet of causality?

[siderea]

^role^rolls

[metahacker.livejournal.com]

I was implying that the function call isn't to RAND(), but to BLACKBOX()...some ability for an intentional being (which then must exist outside the physical universe, for whatever value of 'exist') to affect the universe in microscopic ways. As Alexx points out below, this is just pushing the margin further down, but it's an important distinction, because it pushes it out of the hands of (current) science.

I don't deeply believe this, but it's a hole in the framework for, say, free will or God to wander in.

[alexx-kay.livejournal.com]

I'm with Siderea on this one. For me, the critical argument is one exactly analagous to the one Minsky uses in _The Society Of Mind_ when discussing the issue of defining intelligence: You can't call it a real definition if it's circular; you have to build "intelligence" out of things which are *not* intelligent. Similarly for "free will". Finding some place to "hide a homonculus" is just pushing the question down one order of existence. How does the homonculus get this "free will"?

[metahacker.livejournal.com]

I have no idea. :) See above for why I even entertain this notion...

I have similar problems with "where does the universe come from/what was before the big bang" arguments, of course. (Smart-ass answer: mu.) Those, however, don't have any easy answers.

[cvirtue.livejournal.com]

I answered as best I could, but the real answers are "Maybe, maybe, maybe, and Profoundly Disturbing; happy/sad has as much applicability to it as asking "Garlic or penguin?""

[jducoeur]

Fair enough. The happy/sad axis was an attempt to suss out who found the idea disturbing, but it was really an oversimplification of "does this make you full of horrible angst?".

Noodle-baking time!

[umbran.livejournal.com]

As to the last question - if it were true, my feelings about it are merely the result of the deterministic action of the Universe, or only one of an ensemble of reactions that I have in the various universes out there, picked at random.

If we lack free will, or any form of uniqueness to support an ego, what is the point of caring about my feelings? :)

Re: Noodle-baking time!

[alexx-kay.livejournal.com]

my feelings about it are ... only one of an ensemble of reactions that I have in the various universes out there, picked at random.

Does it really make sense to say that they are random? Each possibility is deterministically chosen. From the point of view of some hypothetical "outside observer", they are all equal, and the distinctions between them could be said to be random -- but we do *not* observe from such a position. We observe from one individual timeline, which we (quite naturally) tend to privilege as "real".

If we lack ... any form of uniqueness to support an ego

I hardly think *that* follows from Many Worlds, or even from lack of free will. Indeed, Many Worlds would tend to suggest that each individual version of you *is* unique (or it wouldn't be a different version).

Re: Noodle-baking time!

[umbran.livejournal.com]

Does it really make sense to say that they are random?

I think so. If I accept and recognize that there are a bazillion and three branches of "me", throughout the many-worlds, whether or not I can perceive the others does not remove their existence. I must accept the fact that what I perceive is not at all privileged - the others are just as real, and I am but one of a very, very large bunch of "me", all of equal status.

Indeed, Many Worlds would tend to suggest that each individual version of you *is* unique (or it wouldn't be a different version).

Yes, but there is nothing at all special about this version. Every possible version of me exists - however wise and bright and virtuous I may think this version of me is, there are others that are foolish and brutish, and they are just as much "me". Somewhere else, I kick puppies and like it. Yet another place I am Stalin come again. And none of this myriad "me" is privileged with more reality than any other.

Honestly, in Many Worlds, it cannot truly be said that anyone ever makes choices, as each choice is realized in the ensemble. Choice is an illusion of our limited perception. And, if you never actually choose anything, there's nothing special about those choices - and what else distinguishes a person from others than the choices they make?

Mind you, it isn't like anyone else is any better. Many-Worlds is even nastier than Determinism, in that regard. Many-Worlds is, imho, the fastest route to nihilism ever wrought by the human mind :)

Re: Noodle-baking time!

[jducoeur]

I don't really agree. My feelings are what they are -- believing that they aren't unique, and that my own ego is at best a fragmentary and ephemeral thing, doesn't change the fact that, right here and right now, I have them.

One of the processes I'm slowly going through is accepting the notion that the fragility of ego is *okay*. At an intellectual level I've believed that for many years (suffice it to say, my belief in the fundamental nature of ego was shattered by a particular experience in college), but I'm only now coming to really internalize that. It's surprisingly comforting Yes, it all means that "I" don't really have a definition outside of Right Here and Right Now. But if probability means *anything*, those feelings still influence the probability of my future timelines, and that's quite relevant to me. (That belief that probability *does* mean something is part of what prevents my worldview from turning nihilistic.)

And yes, the definition of probability in light of many-worlds is fraught. Of all the questions raised by my original Turtles discussion, that's the one that still most gives me fits (followed by the question "what is Time"?) -- I feel like there's a reasonable answer just beyond my fingertips, but I don't yet grasp it. This is what's been leading back to an avid interest in hard science, especially in QM and cosmology...

Re: Noodle-baking time!

[umbran.livejournal.com]

But if probability means *anything*, those feelings still influence the probability of my future timelines...

Um, no, they don't.

Many-Worlds is often stated in terms of "decisions", but that is a simplification. In quantum mechanical terms, is about states. Any state that it is possible to have happens in the Many-Worlds. And that includes emotional states.

Let me make this clear - the Many Worlds interpretation is an attempt to impose determinism upon quantum mechanics. The point of this interpretation is to get away from the idea that God plays dice.

Under classical mechanics, there are no probabilities, as the entire history of the Universe is specified by its initial state, and the laws of physics that determine the interactions. The universe is a great clockwork, and it runs through the motions without deviation.

Under Many Worlds, all the possible end states of the Universe are fully determined by the initial state. And, just to make everyone comfortable, *all* end states happen, through *all* possible paths. Again, there is no real "probability" here - all things do happen. No state that is physically possible can be avoided - by your feelings or otherwise. Whatever is not specifically prohibited is still mandatory. There is no choice. We who are in the tree do not get to mold its shape.

"Feelings" are merely part of the deterministic process. Ego is not fragile - it is irrelevant, because rather than changing the shape of the tree, it is itself part of the tree. In Many Worlds the fact of the matter is that we still have no choice - we cannot make branches of the tree happen or not happen, or change in size or shape. What was possible was still set by the laws and initial state of the Universe, and it all occurs.

[baavgai.livejournal.com]

The many wolds thing is a convenient answer that works for physicists and scifi writers. It fills in observable holes in theory and is therefor accepted because it comforts such folks. For everyone else, not so comforting.

The Strong Anthropic Principle is crap. Yes, people's reality is shaped by supposition and expectation. This much is obvious. However, to assert that such illusions constitute some first hand knowledge is arrogant. This one's been beaten to death, ask Plato about his cave.

Freewill is tricky. Again, also a very well tread path. Taken to the extreme, denying freewill makes us not responsible for anything we do. In addition to making all action meaningless. Many people are all too willing to deny personal responsibility. I personally believe the world would be a better place, and we'd be better people, if we owned our actions rather than avoid the consequences. Strictly on principal, I must vote yes for freewill.

I answered no to all. Yes the world is scary if they're true. So, I choose them not to be. ;)

[alexx-kay.livejournal.com]

Many people are all too willing to deny personal responsibility. I personally believe the world would be a better place, and we'd be better people, if we owned our actions rather than avoid the consequences.

These, we agree on completely.

Taken to the extreme, denying freewill makes us not responsible for anything we do. ... Strictly on principal, I must vote yes for freewill.

These, not so much. To me, this is exactly like denying evolution because of the evils of Social Darwinism. Believeing that the non-existence of free will absolves one of personal responsibility is the same sort of category error that made people think that the fact of evolution implied that Eugenics was a great idea; mistaking an observation about the physical universe with a moral directive. These mistakes are a Bad Thing, but they are not a good reason to stop analyzing the physical universe.

denying freewill ... [makes] all action meaningless.

Again, I disagree. Actions either have meaning or they don't; holding an opinion about the matter does not change that. I believe that "meaning" is entirely a human construct -- I think it is a *good* and *useful* construct, but I don't think that society is best served by denying its essentially artificial nature.

[baavgai.livejournal.com]

Talking of freewill, or it's lack, is problematic. There are many, many degrees. From pure social science ( e.g. their history gave them no choice ) to a scripted reality in the mind of an omniscient God. The freewill described in the question is of the more extreme variety, which is good, because that's when it gets interesting.

Actions either have meaning or they don't.

Given a total absence of Freewill, I'd disagree with this. In a zero freewill scenario, every single action, no matter how minor, is essentially predetermined. After all, an individual's responses are not theirs to choose, they are completely governed by the assumed anti freewill force.

All actions are just a reflection of a system to which the individual is a slave . Ascribing any meaning in such a scenario is like blaming a puppet for beating up another puppet; it's absurd.

[tpau]

mmm, Free Will is a funny one for me. i constantly struggle withthe question of how to reconsile Free Will with an omnicient diety. the way i do it.. is htat all choice are right choice. they are so becausethey arethe ones we made. the yare the ones that put us here andthus we were correct. god knows which we will chose in advance, but we are free tomake that choice without beign pushed to it by anything. that of course includes physics. while it can be said that each choice we make is biological in nature (i see the worldin terms of bio not physics) and driven by our basic needs and our hormones etc, the intelect does play a part. as does morality. so yes everythigninfluences our free will, but in the end it is of course ours.

besides... if it isn't... aren't we jsut abdicating responsibility for our own actions?

[mindways]

- Manyworlds? Plausible to the intuition; the intellect has no idea.
- Strong Anthropic? A bit dubious.
- Free Will Illusory? Plausible to the intellect; intution concedes the possibility but isn't convinced.
- "Yes" to all three of the above? Simultaneously fascinating and terrifying, and I can't decide in which order to put those two adjectives, so I'll just do it alphabetically.

["Yes" to just Free Will Illusory, but not Manyworlds? Much more depressing.]

[jducoeur]

["Yes" to just Free Will Illusory, but not Manyworlds? Much more depressing.]

Yeah, me too. There are some specific spiritual reasons why I find the many-worlds interpretation more palatable than simple determinism -- it fits nicely with my increasingly Minbari outlook on religion...

[herooftheage.livejournal.com]

I haven't actually filled in your poll yet, and I may be opening a can of worms for you here, but I'd say your description of question 2 is actually the weak anthropic principle, not the strong one. I think that the philosophical adherents of the latter would say that there must exist some time in the Universe where the observations hold, not that there just happens to be, and that causes some interesting gotchas.

[jducoeur]

You may well be correct -- an hour or two after writing the poll, I recalled something to that effect. Unfortunately, LJ doesn't allow one to edit polls...

Anthropic

[metageek.livejournal.com]

Right—isn't the strong form the one that says "the Universe is the way it is in order for us to exist"?